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A B S T R A C T
The diﬀerentiated service architecture (DiﬀServ) provides a means for network devices to classify traﬃc based
on the DiﬀServ codepoint (DSCP) and to map the traﬃc to a speciﬁc QoS forwarding treatment. Successful use
beyond the local network depends on consistent remarking and forwarding of the DSCP value inside and at the
boundaries of DiﬀServ domains. This paper provides the results of a new widescale measurement campaign to
examine how the DSCP value is altered as packets travel along a set of Internet paths. This allows us to infer
whether a packet is likely to receive an appropriate QoS treatment and to comment the opportunities for more
widely deploying DiﬀServ QoS. Our results identify a set of remarking pathologies, revealing that many deployed
routers continue to use the previous semantics of the deprecated Type of Service (ToS) ﬁeld. We also note that is
not common to observe clearing of the bits in the DiﬀServ ﬁeld, as previously believed for routers in the core of
the Internet, although this varies signiﬁcantly depending on the type of network studied. Our results are related
to recent IETF work that recommends use of speciﬁc DSCP values.
1. Introduction
Diﬀerentiated Services (DiﬀServ) was ﬁrst introduced in 1998 to
allow diﬀerent Internet ﬂows to receive a speciﬁed Quality of Service
(QoS) treatment [1]. It was introduced to overcome the scalability and
complexity limitations of more ﬁne-grained architectures, by providing
consistent treatment of traﬃc with similar QoS requirements (a traﬃc
class) as this is forwarded along a path. In almost 20 years of service,
DiﬀServ has been integrated with all the principal network technolo-
gies, is largely implemented in access and core networks, and has been
implemented in all major operating systems. However, DiﬀServ has not
emerged as the ﬁnal answer to the problem of bringing QoS to the In-
ternet and its current use is mainly limited to network operator do-
mains.
While DiﬀServ can readily be deployed within a DiﬀServ domain,
there are also opportunities for using DiﬀServ across multiple domains
along an Internet path. This paper discusses the requirements for rea-
lising end-to-end use of DiﬀServ and the barriers for this deployment.
Supported by an analysis of Diﬀerentiated Services Code Point (DSCP)
probes over a range of Internet paths, we show how the misalignment of
practices in processing the DiﬀServ ﬁeld in diﬀerent autonomous sys-
tems (AS), remarking caused by deprecated DSCP semantics still in use
in old equipment, and incorrect router conﬁgurations still have serious
implications on the ability to use DiﬀServ end-to-end. As an example,
we found remarking of DSCPs on certain paths resulted in priority in-
version, i.e. priorities indicated by the DiﬀServ ﬁeld were exchanged
after processing in a sequence of nodes, which could lead to severe
disruption of priority traﬃc.
The debate on interconnection of DiﬀServ domains and harmoni-
sation of practices was recently re-ignited at the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) with the publication of Geib and Black [2]. This
demonstrates the interest in maintaining DSCP markings across inter-
connected domains and proposes a small number of interconnection
classes on MPLS (Multi-protocol Label Switching) networks to support
inter-operation.
Preserving consistent DSCP markings is a critical pre-requisite for
end-to-end QoS across the Internet. Within the Internet core, the DSCP
is usually forwarded transparently. Even in over-provisioned core net-
works, DiﬀServ PHBs can improve robustness of the service (e.g., to
mitigate the impact of DDoS traﬃc [3]).
Whereas in some edge and datacenter networks a range of re-
marking pathologies can be observed, some networks reset the DSCP
value of every packet at entry to their domain. This causes complete
loss of class marking and precludes use of appropriate Per-Hop
Behaviour (PHB)s further along the path. Our measurements show that
these practices are not infrequent. Analysing a dataset of over 25,000
source-destination pairs, we found over 70% of sampled paths showed
some form of DSCP modiﬁcation pathology.
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We argue that inconsistent modiﬁcation is not only damaging to a
proper functioning of DiﬀServ, but also jeopardises the ability to ac-
commodate new traﬃc classes. One example is recent IETF work to
specify a DSCP value for the Lower Eﬀort (LE) service [4], which re-
quires careful consideration to reduce the impact of remarking
pathologies.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 re-
views use of DiﬀServ and related work. Section 3 describes our meth-
odology, where we introduce a new tool, PathTrace, to analyse DSCP
modiﬁcation. This tool was used from vantage points across the Internet
between December 2016 and July 2017. We present the results of our
measurement in Section 4, these extend preliminary work in Custura
et al. [5]. A discussion of the implications on deploying DiﬀServ QoS
follows in Section 5. We also comment upon the implications on current
IETF standards activities. Finally, the conclusion summarises our key
ﬁndings.
2. Background
2.1. Diﬀerentiated services code points
Classiﬁcation of Internet traﬃc was ﬁrst supported by the 8-bit ToS
ﬁeld in the IPv4 header. The ﬁeld was divided into two sub-ﬁelds: the
three most signiﬁcant bits assigned the packet to one of eight pre-
cedence classes, the ﬁve least signiﬁcant bits speciﬁed traﬃc char-
acteristics. The ToS ﬁeld was later re-purposed to carry a DSCP [1] in
the top 6 bits and the Explicit Congestion Notiﬁcation (ECN) [6] ﬁeld in
the bottom 2 bits.
The 6 bit DSCP ﬁeld makes available 64 codepoints. These have
been divided into three groups by the Internet Assigned Number
Authority (IANA)[7]. The 32 codepoints with a zero least signiﬁcant bit
(even codepoints) deﬁne standard DiﬀServ classes. The 16 codepoints
with the two least signiﬁcant bits “11” are available for private use. The
remaining 16 codepoints are currently reserved, but in future have been
proposed to be re-assigned to standard deﬁnitions.
The codepoints take their names from the Per Hop Behaviour (PHB)
or forwarding treatment associated with them. PHBs include the default
Best Eﬀort (BE), AF1-4 (Assured Forwarding 1–4), which deﬁnes packet
drop procedures and Expedited Forwarding (EF). Backwards compat-
ibility with the earlier ToS speciﬁcation was preserved by mapping
eight codepoints (Class Selectors - CS0-7) to the old ToS precedence
classes.
A network implementing DiﬀServ always assigns a better treatment
to EF compared to AF or BE traﬃc, i.e. PHBs are ordered. This ordering
presents a potential obstacle to inter-domain use if a DSCP modiﬁcation
were to remap the EF DSCP to a DSCP for a lower class, while leaving
other DSCP values unchanged. This would cause the EF traﬃc to suﬀer
priority inversion - a broken behaviour where a higher priority is re-
marked to a lower priority, while other priorities are left intact and not
remarked. Consistent DSCP remapping needs to be designed to avoid
this problem.
2.2. Characterisation of DSCP/ToS in internet
The literature on Internet traﬃc analysis is very rich. However, few
studies have focused on DSCP/ToS measurements. Early analysis of ToS
[8,9] evaluated the distribution of codepoints in the Internet, noting the
scarce use of non-default traﬃc classes. However, these papers focused
on ToS usage, rather than characterising pathologies that limit the us-
ability of traﬃc classiﬁcation.
More recent papers provide more insight on DSCP marking. A study
[10] of 14,373 routers using Tracebox [11] reported a per-hop mod-
iﬁcation ratio of the DiﬀServ ﬁeld of 5.75%. This sought to quantify
middlebox interference, and hence did not investigate the detail of
these modiﬁcations. A similar per-hop DSCP modiﬁcation ratio has
been reported [12] from analysing quotations resulting from ICMP
probes to 84,393 web servers via tcptraceroute. This found an in-ﬂight
modiﬁcation ratio of 2.9% for the ToS byte. A smaller study using
Fling [13] reported high disruption to DSCP value in certain wireless
access networks, observing connectivity failures, packet drops and
DSCP modiﬁcation dependent upon the DSCP. Unlike our study, these
studies neither provided statistics on the aﬀected DSCP/ToS ﬁelds nor
did they attempt to classify the remarking pathologies.
Studies of ECN support [14–16] also help identify routers that
continue to use ToS semantics. In 2015, results using PATHspider [15]
showed 2.1% of IPv4 and 18.1% of IPv6 sampled hosts negotiated ECN,
but never generated an ECT-marked packet. This suggests a potential
bleaching of the ECN codepoint. This ﬁgure was later conﬁrmed by a
study for UDP traﬃc [17], which reported 2% of paths towards 2500
sampled servers were unreachable when the ECN ﬁeld was non-zero.
2.3. Use of DiﬀServ by network operators
There are several approaches an operator may utilise the DSCP in
packets forwarded through their domain:
• An operator could assign all traﬃc to single PHB, irrespective of the
DSCP.
• An operator could forward the DSCP unchanged and map traﬃc to a
set of PHBs (e.g., using MPLS).
• An operator could implement a policy that remaps speciﬁc DSCP
values to a diﬀerent DSCP value, and then assign that traﬃc to the
corresponding PHB within their network.
• An operator could drop packets with a DSCP that is not supported in
their network. However, this is inconsistent with Nichols et al. [1]
that recommends domains forward unassigned DSCP values without
change.
In the ﬁrst two approaches the DSCP is carried transparently
through the DiﬀServ domain. Our analysis in Section 4 shows that in
the Internet backbone DSCP values are often transported transparently.
An operator that chooses to oﬀer customers a restricted set of ser-
vice classes (e.g., one supporting residential customers), may remap all
traﬃc to a DSCP corresponding to the PHB for the service to which the
customer subscribed. The same operator could support multiple service
classes for enterprise customers, preserving the DSCP value as it cross
their domain. Examples include the AT&T managed Internet service for
business [18] and Comcast Xﬁnity,1 which include voice services,
Metro-Ethernet business services, IP cable and broadband Internet over
a shared infrastructure, where the DSCP is used to prioritize traﬃc.
Our analysis is unable to distinguish between network operators
that ignore a DSCP and operators that use this to assign traﬃc to a PHB.
However, since both methods do not modify the DSCP value, they do
not impede further use of the DSCP values at other points along the end-
to-end path.
An operator that remaps the DSCP results in an observable pa-
thology that can (if inconsistently applied) impact DSCP usability at
other places on the path. While we did observe various examples of
remarking, this practice was not as widespread as previously suggested
(Section 4). We did not observe consistent remapping of traﬃc with a
speciﬁc DSCP.
3. Methodology
Many tools are available for analysing Internet traﬃc. Our tests
needed a tool able to eﬃciently process a large number of DSCP probes.
This led us to design PathTrace, a tool to explore DSCP modiﬁcation
pathologies.
PathTrace exploits a mechanism similar to traceroute to infer
1 https://www.xﬁnity.com/policies.
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information from quotations returned in Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) packets. All IP routers are required to decrement the
TTL (IPv6 hop count) ﬁeld and discard a packet if the TTL reaches zero.
A router ought to also send an ICMP type 11 (respectively an ICMPv6
type 3 in IPv6) to notify the source of the discarded packet. The ICMP
message includes a quotation of the IP header of the discarded packet.
PathTrace detects modiﬁcations to DSCP value by comparing the quo-
tations in two ICMP messages with consecutive TTL values.
Fig. 1 illustrates the architecture of PathTrace. The Traﬃc Gen-
erator is built upon the packet “forging and dissection” library Scapy.2
Returning ICMP quotations are ﬁrst stored in a ﬁle by the Packet
Capture component, then analysed after the end of probing.
Other tools (e.g., [11,19]) have similarly extended traceroute to
analyse ICMP quotations. In particular, Tracebox detects middleboxes
[11] by analysing packet modiﬁcations including changes in the DSCP
value. Fling is a tool that measures packet manipulation on the path to a
destination server [13]. Other active measurement platforms, such as
RIPE Atlas [20], OONI [21], or Netalyzr [22], also measure perfor-
mance and/or connectivity between a pair of endpoints.
However, the existing tools could not be systematically used to test
a range of DSCP values without adding signiﬁcant functionality and
optimising to reduce processing overhead. While similar to Tracebox,
our tool is fast and lightweight. It stores probes and captured packets
for post-processing. Unlike Fling and OONI, our tool does not require a
central server and is not dependent on crowd-sourced measurements.
3.1. Experiment design and limitations
A known issue in using traceroute results when encountering per-
packet (or per-ﬂow) load-balancing routers. These can forward probes
along diﬀerent paths, for instance using equal cost multiple path
routing, confusing processing of ICMP responses [19]. In our tests,
packets probing diﬀerent DSCP values were sent with the same 5-tuple
to ensure that probes were not aﬀected by this form of load balancing.
Another complication arises when traceroute is used over tunnels
and with hidden nodes that also do not decrement the TTL [23,24].
MPLS tunnels in particular are common and unless the MPLS routers are
instructed to reveal the internal structure of the tunnel (e.g using the
ttl-propagate option in Cisco routers [23]) the nodes within the
tunnel remain invisible. To mitigate this problem, we considered only
the DSCP modiﬁcations observed at adjacent hops, as opposed to those
observed in isolation [12].
We space probes for the ﬁrst 4 hops, to reduce the likelihood of
being impacted by routers within the local network that limit the rate of
ICMP packets
To minimise disruption, we used well-known low ports normally
allowed through ﬁrewalls. For the dataset “Mobile Edge”, however, we
used high numbered TCP and UDP ports, because low-numbered ports
from the vantage point were ﬁrewalled and port 80 was redirected to a
proxy service [25].
Traceroute suﬀers from the limitation that only routers closer to the
vantage point can be probed accurately. As probes progress along the
path, the DSCP may be modiﬁed reducing the ability to explore the full
set of codepoints further along the path [26,27]. To evaluate how the
pathologies are aﬀected by our choice of vantage point, we present
statistics for a vantage point in addition to aggregate statistics. This
conﬁrms common pathologies when probing routers in distant disjoint
regions.
Finally, we note the need to consider interface aliases (when the
same router is identiﬁed by more than one IP address), which could
contribute bias in our results.
Our measurement campaigns explored use of UDP and TCP traﬃc.
Web servers were used as targets, taking advantage of the existing
comprehensive lists of popular web servers. DNS resolution was per-
formed from a diﬀerent location to all vantage points to avoid using
pre-assigned mapping, and/or content caching and distribution me-
chanisms for popular servers (CDNs). Fetching web content is a
common service, and it is possible that operators could have speciﬁc
DiﬀServ policies in place. However, our results did not ﬁnd any bias
between the treatment of web and DNS traﬃc.
3.2. DSCP datasets
To cross-validate our ﬁndings, we considered three data sets. The
list of target destinations was drawn from the top 100,000 websites
Fig. 1. The PathTrace tool.
2 http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/.
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from the Cisco Umbrella 1 million3 and Alexa Top 500 Sites. Webserver
names were resolved using Hellﬁre.4 When a name resolved to more
than one address, one of the addresses was selected at random, except
for the ﬁnal campaign of the dataset “PathTrace” where one IPv4 and
one IPv6 addresses were selected to diversify the sampling.
Dataset A (“PATHspider”) was built between January and July 2017
extending to all non-zero codepoints the PATHspider measurements in
Learmonth et al. [28] probing a random selection of 100,000 websites.
This dataset includes additional measurements using DSCP 2 and DSCP
46 from eight Digital Ocean datacentres.5
Dataset B (“PathTrace”) consisted of three measurement campaigns.
The ﬁrst campaign (dataset B.1) ran in December 2016 from three
Digital Ocean data centres towards a list of 100 targets for a total of 300
source-destination pairs. The second campaign (dataset B.2) in February
2017 targeted 200 web servers using TCP port 80 from eight locations
counting 1440 source-destination pairs. The third campaign (dataset
B.3) ran in July 2017 towards the top 500 web servers in the Cisco top
website list, using one IPv4 and IPv6 address for each target, for a total
of 961 unique IP addresses. The ECN ﬁeld of probe packets was set to 11
to infer correlations between ECN and DSCP modiﬁcation.
Dataset C (“Mobile Edge”) used PathTrace and featured data col-
lected for 100 Webserver from the Alexa top websites list from 107
mobile vantage points within the European MONROE platform [29], for
a total of 9202 diﬀerent source-destination pairs. A range of DSCP va-
lues were sent using both UDP and TCP. The measurements were
completed between September 2016 and January 2017.
3.3. DSCP pathologies
Our analysis revealed a number of recurrent DSCP modiﬁcation
pathologies, described below. The following section provides a quan-
titative analysis of the various pathologies.
• DSCP bleaching: This pathology resets the DSCP ﬁeld to zero. This
remaps all ﬂows to the default traﬃc class.
• ToS bleaching: This pathology resets to zero the upper 3 bits of the
DSCP ﬁeld (the former ToS precedence ﬁeld), leaving other bits
unchanged. This behaviour is distinctive of non-DiﬀServ aware
routers.
• ToS bleaching except CS6/CS7: This pathology is a variant of ToS
bleaching, where the ToS precedence ﬁeld is reset only if the ToS is
not 110 or 111. These markings correspond to the CS6 (Network
Control) and CS7 (Internetwork Control) codepoints, which identify
critical Internet traﬃc. This also is an indication of a non-DiﬀServ
aware router.
• DSCP remarking and multiple remarking: This pathology resets the
DSCP ﬁeld to a speciﬁc codepoint or to a pool of few codepoints.
This may be a result of DiﬀServ traﬃc conditioning.
4. Results
4.1. DSCP remarking pathologies
To characterise DSCP modiﬁcation pathologies, we considered the
remarking behaviour of 3040 IPv4 and 1093 IPv6 routers in dataset B.2
and B.3. A router was considered only when it could be probed by at
least 30 distinct codepoints. This allowed us to evaluate the router
behaviour across a suﬃciently large range of DSCP values to clearly
identify the remarking pathology. Each probes sent TCP packets en-
capsulated in IPv4 or IPv6 datagrams. Table 1 reports he number of
routers encountered in each dataset for each pathology, as well as the
95% conﬁdence interval in brackets. Table 2 presents the percentage of
routers with pathologies using each vantage point.
Almost one-fourth of IPv4 routers exhibited some pathological be-
haviour in DSCP remarking, with a signiﬁcant number of routers im-
plementing ToS bleaching (around 11% and 7% in dataset B.2 and B.3
respectively). This is clear evidence of routers continue to be conﬁgured
with policies based on ToS semantics.
A router conﬁgured to use ToS semantics can utilise the ToS
Precedence ﬁeld to categorise traﬃc. A policy to disable such class-
based ﬂow management, could reset the 3 highest bits of the ToS/DSCP
without updating the remainder of the ﬁeld. This is however proble-
matic when routers use DiﬀServ semantics, because it can result in
unrecognized DSCP values for the remainder of the path and can result
in priority inversion. This pathology was encountered from all vantage
points, with a distribution that varied between 0.7% and 25%.
ToS bleaching (except for C6 and C7) was observed from all vantage
points for around 3% of routers. This varied between 0.4% and 4.8%
depending on vantage point and is also an indication of old or mis-
conﬁgured routers. All vantage-point dependent variations can be at-
tributed to using geographically diverse locations, connected via dif-
ferent providers.
A small proportion of IPv4 routers (around 1% and 4% respectively
in dataset B.2 and B.3) implemented DSCP bleaching. We encountered
this pathology for all vantage points tested, with between 1.8% and 7%
variation depending on the vantage point. Resetting the DSCP may
result from traﬃc conditioning at the edge of a DiﬀServ domain, or
where no other policy is in place between two operators [30]. We ob-
serve this only in a small percentage of routers. This is less prevalent
that suggested in [2]. Since DSCP-bleaching does not aﬀect DSCP se-
mantics (e.g., does not cause priority inversion), the impact of this is
less disruptive than that caused by ToS precedence bleaching.
A number of other pathologies were observed. These include DSCP
Table 1
DSCP modiﬁcation pathologies.
Dataset B.2 Dataset B.3 Description
=routers 918 =routers 2122 IPv4
hosts C.I. (%) hosts C.I. (%)
694 (73–78) 1555 (71–75) Transparent
10 (0.4–1.9) 81 (3.0–4.7) Reset DSCP
102 (9.2–13) 156 (6.3–8.5) Reset ToS prec.
33 (2.4–4.8) 54 (1.9–3.3) Reset ToS prec. CS6/CS7
15 (0.9–2.5) 4 (0.0–0.4) ToS prec. remap
10 (0.4–1.9) 59 (2.1–3.5) DSCP remark
7 (0.2–1.4) 54 (1.9–3.3) DSCP multiple remark
47 (3.7–6.5) 159 (6.4–8.6) Other remarking
=routers 93 =routers 1000 IPv6
hosts C.I. (%) hosts C.I. (%)
85 (85–97) 886 (87–91) Transparent
0 (0–3.2) 6 (0.2–1.1) Reset DSCP
0 (0–3.2) 5 (0.1–0.1) Reset ToS prec.
0 (0–3.2) 3 (0–0.7) Reset ToS prec. CS6/CS7
2 (0–5.3) 30 (2–4.1) DSCP remark
0 (0–3.2) 36 (2.5–4.8) DSCP multiple remark
6 (2.1–12) 34 (2.3–4.6) Other remarking
Table 2
Percentage for IPv4 DSCP modiﬁcation pathologies per vantage point, dataset
B.2.
AMS BLR FRA LON NYC SFO TOR %
65.3 80 66.3 83.3 77.4 92.1 67.6 Transparent
1.8 5.4 2.6 6.2 6.3 2.5 7 Reset DSCP
24.6 2.6 16.1 3.6 10.1 0.7 15.4 Reset ToS prec.
3.75 3.8 4.8 0.8 2.7 0.3 1.4 Reset ToS prec. CS6/CS7
1.8 3.0 6.1 3.1 0.4 2.2 2.8 DSCP remark
2.1 0.4 3.4 2.2 2.7 1.4 5.6 DSCP multiple remark
320 420 229 354 444 827 71 Total routers
3 https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/12/14/cisco-umbrella-1-million/.
4 https://github.com/irl/hellﬁre.
5 https://www.digitalocean.com/.
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remarking and multiple remarking, mapping the ToS ﬁeld to a diﬀerent
ToS class (ToS remapping), and other remarking pathologies involving
only a range of DSCP values. Together these cases represent between
8.8% and 11% of tested routers. As anticipated, multiple remarking
appears to result at the peering between DiﬀServ domains.
Remarking to a single or multiple codepoints was observed from all
vantage points, varying between around 0.5% and 6% depending on
vantage point. ToS remapping was observed in routers from one van-
tage point only, in campaign B.3.
Table 1 reports statistics for IPv6 routers. Although based on a
smaller number of routers, these ﬁgures clearly show a much larger
proportion of IPv6 routers transparently propagate the DSCP (around
90%). However, some remarking (< 1%) to zero, to a single codepoint
(around 3%) or multiple codepoints(around 3%) was observed from all
vantage points, with a vantage point dependent variation between 0.6%
and 10% for single remarking and 1% and 6% for multiple remarking.
Perhaps surprisingly, a small number of IPv6 routers (< 1%) were seen
to employ ToS semantics, albeit observed only by three vantage points.
4.2. Preservation of the DSCP across networks
The remarking behaviour of routers can be detected by observing
the DSCP value at the end of a path. Fig. 2 displays the percentage of
transparent paths as a function of the original codepoint, comparing
measurements in each of the datasets B. To avoid local bias, this only
considers paths longer than three hops.
Excluding the default DSCP, which is delivered unchanged over
more than 80% of paths, the diagram displays three plateaus: The
plateau between DSCP 1 and 8 represents codepoints starting with
‘000’. These codepoints are unaﬀected by ToS precedence bleaching
and therefore have a higher chance of not being changed by the path.
Similarly, the rightmost plateau between DSCP 48 and 63 represents
codepoints starting with ‘110’ or ‘111’. These codepoints survive a ToS
precedence bleaching that preserves CS6 and CS7. The remaining co-
depoints have a lower probability of survival and are unchanged over
less than 40% of the paths.
Fig. 2. Percentage of paths with no DSCP modiﬁcation.
Fig. 3. Percentage of unchanged DSCP value for networks traversed.
Table 3
Percentage of remarking at the last hop of the mobile network (dataset C).
init. DSCP BE Unch. DSCP 6 AF11 Others
BE (73) 73 8.9 10 7.6
DSCP 3 60 8 12 11 8.1
CS1 54 36 2.4 2.1 5.7
AF11 54 38 2.4 (38) 5.9
EF 48 36 2.4 2.1 12
Table 4
Number of connections and percentage success/failure measured by
PATHspider.
# Conn. attempts %
Both succeeded 12M 99.99
Both failed 5430 0.01
Baseline succeeded 3430 0.01
Test succeeded 6430 0.01
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Fig. 3 illustrates the observed DSCP modiﬁcations along the path.
The ﬁgure shows the percentage of DSCP values that remain un-
changed, as a function of the number of network groups traversed. A
network group is as a set of contiguous hops sharing a /16 IPv4 address
preﬁx. We chose this grouping because we modiﬁcations tended to
result at the peering points between domains rather than within do-
mains. Fig. 3(a) refers to dataset B.3 featuring vantage points in Digital
Ocean networks, whereas Fig. 3(b) refers to measurements in dataset C
from mobile edge networks.
Nearly all the DSCP values traverse the ﬁrst network without
modiﬁcation (Fig. 3(a)). This suggests our measurements are not biased
by the infrastructure of our chosen vantage points. Most remarking
occurs at the second and third network peering within backbone net-
works or at an Internet Exchange Point. Network equipment at Internet
exchanges route packet across ASNs and can therefore appear in various
network address spaces. For this reason, it is not always possible to
identify which AS caused a modiﬁcation.
4.3. DSCP at the mobile edge
This subsection focuses on mobile network vantage points. These
measurements present a diﬀerent set of pathologies and remarking
behaviours compared to the core Internet. Fig. 3b shows that most
DSCP values are remarked on entry to the mobile network. The per-
centage of unchanged codepoints falls below 40% immediately after the
ﬁrst network group. The DSCP values are coloured with speciﬁc non-
zero codepoints, indicating an exclusive use of the DSCP within the
mobile network. For example, many codepoints were remapped to the
AF class (e.g., AF13 or AF12) irrespective of their initial value. This
remarking seems to not be based on the DSCP value, with DSCP 0 often
also remarked.
We observed a second remarking at the edge of the network, before
packets leave the mobile domain. Each column in Table 3 shows the
percentage of each remarked DSCP value on leaving the mobile net-
work compared to the DSCP value at entry. In most cases, DSCP values
were bleached (i.e. reset to zero) when packets left the mobile domain.
The two-stage remarking behaviour, while typical of a mobile net-
work, was not found in any of our core measurement datasets. It re-
sulted in very few DSCP values (less than 5%) arriving unchanged
through the mobile network.
4.4. DSCP-related connectivity impairments
Dataset A was used to investigate potential end-to-end connectivity
problems resulting from use of a speciﬁc DSCP. The test opened a
connection using the default DSCP value (baseline case), followed by
opening connections to the same target using each of the other 63 co-
depoints (test case). The test case failed if a connection could not be
opened for at least one of the DSCP values. Table 4 reports the number
of connections where only the baseline case succeeded, only the test
case succeeded, and both succeeded or failed.
These results conﬁrm that the ability of endpoints to connect to an
endpoint is not aﬀected by the DSCP value. The small amount of
breakage (less than 0.01%) is attributed to other network failures, such
as busy server rejections or momentary link failures. These results diﬀer
from ones reported in [13] where some breakage was observed for
speciﬁc networks. In our case, tests were performed from a vantage in a
network known to propagate DSCP transparently (the academic Janet
network). Repeating the test from a further eight locations for code-
points 2 and EF in Digital Ocean also obtained similar results.
4.5. Transport-dependent changes to the DSCP
The datasets B.1 and C were used to determine whether the choice
of transport protocol (TCP or UDP) aﬀected the DSCP remarking along a
path.
Table 5 reports a breakdown of the remarking ratio for each DSCP
modiﬁcation pathology for the set of routers in the dataset that were
reached by at least eight distinct DSCP probes. The ﬁrst and second
column in Table 5 report the number of routers that introduced a cer-
tain pathology for TCP and UDP respectively along with the corre-
sponding range of modiﬁcation ratios (in percentage) between brackets.
The similarity of success for TCP and UDP is evident (a two-sample
t-test produces p-values larger than 0.8). This demonstrates that current
remarking is unrelated to the choice of transport protocol. The small
discrepancy is attributed to other failures, such as temporary link fail-
ures or congestion loss of a probe packet.
A similar result was also found when evaluating DSCP remarking at
the last hop. The ﬁrst and second column in Table 6 report the number
of DSCP values observed at the last hop when a probe was sent with an
EF codepoint. Again, the small discrepancy is not attributed to the
choice of transport protocol.
4.6. DSCP observed at the last hop
Fig. 4 presents our data in the form of a heat map. This plots the
original DSCP value (vertical axis) against the DSCP value at the end of
the observed path (horizontal axis). The strong diagonal line in the plot
corresponds to DSCP values that remain unchanged across the path.
The vertical lines in the map indicate remarking to the DSCP value
shown on the horizontal axis. Vertical lines can be identiﬁed for DF/BE
(very strong), CS1 (very faint), AF11, AF21, CS3 and CS4. A signiﬁcant
number of routers remap all incoming codepoints to default (0). There
is some remapping to other well-known codepoints.
One other diagonal pattern can be distinguished, spanning DSCP
values 0–7. These repeat seven times in a clear pattern, consistent with
Table 5
Remarking for each DSCP modiﬁcation pathology using TCP and UDP.
TCP UDP Description
=routers 449 =routers 449 Dataset B.1
C.I. (%) C. I. (%)
335 (71–78) 337 (71–79) Transparent
16 (2.0–5.3) 16 (2.0–5.3) Reset DSCP
55 (9.4–15) 53 (8.9–15) Reset ToS prec.
31 (4.7–9.3) 30 (4.5–9.1) Reset ToS prec. CS6/CS7
12 (1.2–4.2) 13 (1.6–4.6) Other remarking
=routers 507 =routers 393 Dataset C
C. I. (%) C. I. (%)
418 (79–86) 325 (79–86) Transparent
26 (3.4–7.1) 22 (3.6–7.9) Reset DSCP
24 (3.0–6.7) 18 (2.5–6.9) Reset ToS prec.
39 (5.5–10) 28 (4.6–9.7) Other remarking
Table 6
DSCP remarking at the last hop when injecting EF probes using TCP and UDP.
TCP UDP DSCP at last hop
=paths 581 =paths 581 Dataset B.1
C. I. (%) C. I. (%)
223 (34–42) 225 (35–42) BE
281 (44–52) 278 (44–52) EF
46 (5.9–10) 49 (6.2–10.8) 6
14 (1.2–3.8) 14 (1.2–3.8) CS1
7 (0–2.2) 7 (0.3–2.2) 41
10 (0–2.9) 8 (0.5–2.4) Others
=paths 291 =paths 291 Dataset C
C. I. (%) C. I. (%)
38 (9.3–17) 39 (9.6–18) BE
148 (45–57) 147 (45–56) EF
92 (26–37) 94 (27–38) 6
5 (0.3–3.4) 5 (0.3–3.4) CS1
3 (0–2.4) 3 (0–2.4) AF21
3 (0–2.4) 3 (0–2.4) Others
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bleaching of the three high-order bits (ToS bleaching).
4.7. Changes to the ECN ﬁeld and DSCP
Dataset B.3 was used to evaluate the dependency between DSCP and
ECN modiﬁcation. The experiment sent probes with the ECN ﬁeld set to
11 (congestion experienced - CE mark) and counted the number of hops
where a transition to 00 (non-ECN mark) was observed, both with and
without DSCP modiﬁcation. Table 7 presents a 2 × 2 contingency
table reporting the number of hops in each of the four cases (with DSCP
or ECN modiﬁed or not). The number in brackets reports the percentage
of hops with respect to the total for each row.
Although the number of router hops that clear the ECN ﬁeld is small
(0.3%), this data shows a clear dependency between clearing the ﬁeld
and changing the DSCP value (χ2-test provides a p-value much larger
than one). 8.2% of hops register a change of DSCP with no change to
the ECN ﬁeld. This proportion rises to 40% when the ECN ﬁeld is
cleared.
An analysis of the type of changes that occur when the ECN ﬁeld is
cleared reveals that the DSCP was reset in 52% of cases and remarked to
a diﬀerent DSCP in 48%. These results conﬁrm the ﬁndings in [31] that
ECN clearing is related to modiﬁcation of the entire ToS byte. Although
more disruptive to DiﬀServ, resetting the ToS precedence is safer for
ECN because this does not alter the ECN ﬁeld.
5. Discussion
99.99% of the tested paths oﬀered connectivity irrespective of the
DSCP value that was used for the packets. This result is encouraging for
DiﬀServ deployment since it shows that DiﬀServ-based packet dropping
within the core and server side networks is not common.
In considering whether DiﬀServ oﬀers a useful QoS function, we
examine how far the original QoS requirement is reﬂected by the DSCP
as packets are forwarded. Our experiments observed that over 70% of
routers pass the DSCP without modiﬁcation. In the remaining cases, the
DSCP is remarked. The discussion now explores several of these cases.
5.1. Impact of legacy ToS treatment
DSCP modiﬁcation by routers using ToS semantics are the biggest
barrier to survivability of commonly used DSCP values, but we found no
evidence this results in loss. In the set of routers that changed the DSCP,
the most prevalent pathology was to reset to zero the highest three bits
of the DiﬀServ ﬁeld. This pathology is attributed to IPv4 routers that
implement obsoleted ToS Precedence bleaching. This DSCP manipula-
tion pathology reduces the likelihood that packets receive the desired
PHB for the remainder of their path. A small number of IPv6 routers
exhibit a similar pathology.
There is a signiﬁcant opportunity to improve end-to-end transpar-
ency by by updating these router conﬁgurations to use DiﬀServ se-
mantics. We also expect the prevalence of this pathology to diminish as
old equipment reaches the end of life.
5.2. DiﬀServ interconnection (Intercon)
Diﬀerentiated Services (DiﬀServ) InterconY.1566 deﬁnes a set of
four common QoS classes and four auxiliary classes, to which DiﬀServ
traﬃc may be mapped [2]. This targets operations between separately
administered networks interconnected using the MPLS Short-Pipe
tunnel mode and has the potential to extend consistent DiﬀServ treat-
ment between DiﬀServ domains. The codepoints chosen do not set the
highest two bits of the DSCP; with the exception of the default DSCP,
but we note that this set of codepoints are in the range shown in Fig. 2
have the highest probability of DSCP modiﬁcation as a packet traverses
the path.
Intercon also recommends remarking unknown or unexpected co-
depoints to default (DSCP 0), assuming this practice is already widely
deployed. However, our results for core and server paths did not show
this was common practice for the network paths that we tested. Only a
small number of routers remarked a subset of codepoints to DSCP 0 and
remapped others diﬀerently. These routers may be closer to the edge,
and therefore the number of codepoints seen was too few to be selected
for analysis. Our data also only examined the core and data centre
portions of the network path, and it may be that access providers have
adopted other practices, about which we are unable to currently com-
ment.
Fig. 4. Observed DSCP at the last hop, ( =n 1740).
Table 7
Comparison of DSCP and ECN modiﬁcations in 3,086,977 adjacent hops.
DSCP changed DSCP unchanged
hops (%) hops (%)
ECN cleared 2555 40% 6032 60%
ECN unchanged 255,421 8.2% 2,822,969 91.8%
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5.3. Comparison to mobile results
A diﬀerent set of pathologies arise for mobile networks, which are
much less transparent to the DSCP value. Inside the mobile networks
that we studied, we observed remarking to several codepoints depen-
dent on the country and mobile operator. The remarking was irre-
spective of the original DSCP, implying a remarking by a local policy.
The GSM Association guidelines [32] for interconnection of mobile
backbones could in future help coordinate inter-domain use of DSCPs
within mobile networks. However, we did not see evidence of these
guidelines currently being implemented.
When packets leave the mobile domain, they are subject to the same
pathologies as in the Internet core. The most prevalent (58% of packets)
is to reset the DSCP to 0, before they traverse the remainder of the path.
5.4. Selecting a DSCP for applications
Results using PATHspider show that it is safe to enable DSCP
marking for applications. There is very little evidence of packet loss due
to using a speciﬁc codepoint. An application can expect to gain beneﬁts
from DiﬀServ locally, but current data suggests it is likely to experience
remarking after a few hops. Within the core, routers using ToS se-
mantics can also still lead to unrecognized codepoints that prevent
packets from receiving the desired PHB in the later part of their path.
Of the standardised DSCP values, DSCP 0–7 were observed to be the
least unchanged on core paths, which we suggest is due to the higher
order 3 bits of the DSCP being already zero. We did not see signiﬁcant
evidence that using any other well-known codepoint will signiﬁcantly
increase/decrease the probability of successful DSCP end-to-end tra-
versal, but note the remarking recommendations in Intercon, as a sign
that unsupported DSCP marks could in future be remarked as default
(DSCP 0).
For mobile networks, applications can expect to sometimes exploit
DiﬀServ locally, potentially gaining beneﬁt within the mobile network,
but at the current time, we would expect remarking of most DSCP va-
lues after traversing a mobile network.
5.5. A DiﬀServ codepoint for scavenger traﬃc
Previous work suggested the use of a DSCP to identify traﬃc de-
siring a Lower Eﬀort LE treatment (also known as scavenger class).
RFC3662 [33] suggests using CS1 (DSCP 8) for this traﬃc, a marking
that has been used in Internet2 [34]. However, while this code point is
permitted in DiﬀServ, it is at odds with the normal priority of CS class
markings, and has not been oﬃcially assigned by IANA for this purpose.
We therefore explore the suitability of using DSCP 8, based on our
understanding of DSCP modiﬁcation pathologies in Internet. The results
in Fig. 4 showing ToS precedence bleaching, indicate this codepoint has
a 36.82% probability of being reset to DSCP 0, causing traﬃc to be
treated with the PHB for the default class. This is arguably better than
priority inversion, but does not realise the desired an LE treatment. It is
therefore important that any use of DSCP 8 for background traﬃc does
not rely solely on the DSCP for controlling the capacity used by the
scavenger application.
Recent work at the IETF is revisiting the use of DSCP 8 and one
proposal is use DSCP 2 for LE traﬃc. This codepoint has one of highest
retention rates, we therefore expect it to be forwarded by routers
without change. This DSCP is not subject to priority inversion.
However, we expect other traﬃc (AF11, AF21, AF31, AF41) to be re-
marked by ToS precedence bleaching resulting in this codepoint, this
would cause priority inversion for AF traﬃc and the possibility that this
traﬃc may erroneously also be assigned to the LE PHB.
Although prevalence of ToS precedence bleaching is expected to
diminish with time, priority inversion is nevertheless a serious concern.
After understanding these concerns, the IETF is instead considering
reassigning use of DSCP 1 as a marking for LE traﬃc.
5.6. Recommendations for DSCP usage in webRTC
WebRTC provides browsers and mobile applications with Real-Time
Communications (RTC) capabilities via simple APIs. IETF work in
support of WebRTC [35] recommends a set of DSCP values for general
Internet use. This subsection brieﬂy examines the pathologies for this
set of codepoints. WebRTC is typically used as a peer-to-peer applica-
tion and would therefore beneﬁt from edge-to-edge support for DSCP
markings.
The speciﬁcation recommends using the default class (DSCP 0) for
low priority, the EF class for voice, and a set of AF class markings for
video traﬃc. Our results show that traﬃc with these markings was
passed through the networks that we tested. Remarking to DSCP 0 and
ToS bleaching could impact the ability of the remote endpoint to ob-
serve the desired DSCP, in both core and mobile networks.
The proposed speciﬁcation currently recommends use of CS1 for
traﬃc with a “very low” application priority. A future standardised LE
codepoint may be more suitable for this traﬃc.
6. Future work
Results show transparency with respect to packet traversal, but still
display unwanted pathologies as the DiﬀServ ﬁeld is changed on an
Internet path. The measurement technique presented in this paper may
help identify legacy routers that need to be replaced or reconﬁgured to
avoid these undesirable pathologies. The current prevalence of such
router conﬁgurations suggests that these measurements could also
usefully be repeated in future years to track whether this problem re-
duces as predicted.
Our measurement results for the core should encourage increased
attention to enabling DiﬀServ in the access part of the Internet path.
Our exploration of DSCP modiﬁcation pathologies at the edge of the
Internet was limited to mobile networks. We therefore encourage ex-
perimentation to understand DSCP remarking pathologies across a
range of access equipment networks.
We encourage operators to continue to deploy PHBs to which DSCP
packet markings can be mapped, and to make this information avail-
able. However, we were unable to test whether PHBs had been de-
ployed in the networks we tested, nor could we comment on eﬀorts by
operators to implement conditioning at the boundaries between
DiﬀServ domains. Measurements examining the forwarding treatment
received by packets are by their nature more disruptive than the tests
described in this paper, and may be hard to verify without congestion
information at the time of measurement.
7. Conclusion and next steps
This paper presents a new tool for observing DSCP modiﬁcation
pathologies and provides new large-scale measurements using ﬁxed-
core and mobile edge networks. Our results examine a range of DSCP
values and modiﬁcation pathologies as packets traverse an end-to-end
path. While we observed few cases where networks discard packets
with a speciﬁc codepoint, the more signiﬁcant result is that many
networks do modify the DSCP value. Even so, we recommend appli-
cations to set a DSCP and provide speciﬁc recommendations.
While there is evidence of operator conﬁguration using DiﬀServ,
much of the observed remarking appears to arise from routers conﬁg-
ured to use historic ToS semantics. In some cases, this results in priority
inversion. The strong recommendation is to reconﬁgure and/or upgrade
these routers, to provide greater opportunity for using DiﬀServ across
an entire network path. We also recommend continued measurement of
DSCP remarking both in the core/server portions of the network and to
characterise access networks.
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Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2018.05.016.
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